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SYMPOSIUM REMARKS: TERRORISM AND




Everything I'm going to talk about will be geared toward large
property commercial property insurance placements. If you
would, the Fortune 1000 type placements. Where we digress
from that client base we will so note.
There is a lot of grit in the wheels of the economy due to the
issues related to the business dynamics of the late nineties.
Then superimpose upon this the risk of terrorism. Everyone you
talk to at Treasury says the whole purpose of TRIAL was to help
oil those wheels of commerce and provide some economic
incentive to create an insurance market for terrorism. These
kinds of issues, the volatility and the uncertainty associated with
terrorism, is a very different kind of economic risk to this country
than we have had in the past.
What's going on? There has been an immense amount of
energy spent by insurers and brokers on their clients' behalf to
try to understand what's going on with TRIA. Not many clients
are buying. As far as the in-force policy offer that was mandated
These remarks are an actual transcript of the author's comments at the St. John's
Journal of Legal Commentary Symposium on Mar. 14, 2003.
1 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, 107 Pub. L. 297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002). Section
101(b) of TRIA states its purposes as:
The purpose of this title is to establish a temporary Federal program that provides for
a transparent system of shared public and private compensation for insured losses
resulting from acts of terrorism, in order to - -
(1) protect consumers by addressing market disruptions and ensure the continued
widespread availability and affordability of property and casualty insurance for
terrorism risk; and
(2) allow for a transitional period for the private markets to stabilize, resume
pricing of such insurance, and build capacity to absorb any future losses, while
preserving State insurance regulation and consumer protections.
Id. at § 101(b)(1)-(2).
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during the 90-day period commencing November 26th,2 we are
seeing that our clients who rely on risk management strategies
other than the purchase of insurance, are thinking more
thoughtfully about TRIA in the context of their next renewal.
Why are some policyholders buying TRIA? Principally inner-
city risks in the major metropolitan areas, 3 or those that have
some idea that they're exposed based on their security
department's analysis are buying TRIA.4 Also buying, are
insureds who believe they are targets (like entertainment
venues) or responsible for major infrastructure facilities. 5
Finally, there is a body of buyers out there who adopted a "buy"
strategy because it (TRIA) was relatively cheap. From a property
insurance premium point of view if it's less than five percent of
the premium, why not buy? These buyers thought process goes
like this; "I had a terrorism exclusion before and now for five
percent of my premium and I can make that exclusion go away,
why not?"
Who's buying? Real estate and construction firms top the list
as to who has purchased the TRIA coverage. 6 This is mainly due
to mortgage or other contractual obligations. Marine facilities
and other types of target businesses have also been some of the
early adopters. But, why in general are policyholders not
buying? I think the key thing, particularly in the manufacturing
section; America is in denial. They do not feel they are exposed.
There has been a discussion in the boardroom of just about every
Fortune 1000 company where the Corporate Security Chief has
2 Id. § 103(b)(2)-(b)(3) (stating that no payment will be made by the Secretary of the
Treasury for loss under the act unless the insurer provides clear disclosure to the
policyholder of all terms of the act within 90 days of November 26, 2002, the date the act
was passed).
3 See U.S. Terrorism Insurance Too Costly For Many, FORBES, available at
http://www.forbes.com/newswire/2003 /04/17/rtr943880.html (Apr. 17, 2003) (discussing
the prohibitively high prices attached to terrorism insurance for "highly visible"
metropolitan would-be insureds, such as stadiums, apartment buildings, and major
financial centers).
4 See generally Susan Reda, Terrorism Insurance - What's Your Level of Risk?, STORES
MAG., available at http://www.stores.org/archives/2O03/O5/cover.asp (May 2003)
(discussing recent risk assessments being weighed against the high cost of terrorism
insurance by businesses in metropolitan areas).
5 Id. (noting that some owners of strip malls across the country are being pro-active and
purchasing terrorism insurance).
6 See Dave Lenckus & Roberto Ceniceros, High Rates for Terror Cover Shift Focus to
Preparedness; RIMS 2003, BUS. INS., Apr. 21, 2003, at 10 (citing example of successful
Milwaukee-based real estate firm who purchased coverage under TRIA and their
rationale behind it).
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gotten up and said, "we've got it covered, we're cool." However,
you can never be prepared enough for the ingenuity of the
devices, nor for the motivations of the people that are our enemy.
Another issue is the measurement of terrorism risk. There is a
lot of talk about the lack of risk models that we can believe to be
credible. I was in the insurance business in the early days of
earthquake and windstorm models and was probably one of the
early doubters. But, as you become more familiar with how these
models work they become very useful tools. They do not tell you
how to make a decision, but they certainly frame the construct of
your decisions. I think insurers need terrorism models to
support their underwriting. For that matter, the more
sophisticated risk management retail buyer, the more the
company risk manager would like to be able to have access to
these kind of models at some point.
Back to TRIA. The rollout process was quite chaotic. The
layering, and quota sharing of how various insurance programs
are put together greatly complicated the picture. For example,
you could get the price of a dollar in the first layer and two
dollars for the next excess or the second layer. It is just all over
the map. Many risk managers are saying "I am just going to
wait until renewal and maybe we can make a little more sense
out of it then." Besides that, they say "I can go upstairs in the
meantime, see my boss and maybe create a budget for this."
To reiterate, pricing was all over the map. It was expensive in
many cases. 7 By expensive, I am defining that as higher than
the median or the average. Some of the risk we have talked
about as being more exposed probably deserved higher pricing.
It was very clear that some carriers did not want this risk on
their balance sheet and they wanted to price themselves out of it.
We had little cookie factories up in the northern woods of
Minnesota where the price was one hundred percent of the
property premium. Meanwhile, for a nice 20-story building on
the Upper West Side of New York it may be a 15% surcharge on
the property premium. So pricing was just all over the lot.
Because TRIA is new as is the whole idea of thinking about your
7 See Richard Allyn & Heather McNeff, Justice in a Changed World: The Fall and Rise
of Terrorism Insurance Coverage Since September 11, 2001, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
821, 842 (2003) (discussing how many insurers claim deductibles too expensive, creating
huge liability before federal dollars even become available).
2004]
474 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 18:2
insurance policy in the context of either having or not having a
terrorism exclusion and, further, even to the finer points of that
exclusion applying to certified events or non-certified events ...
this is a new risk management decision. Thus, if you are the risk
manager of a firm and you have a budget and a process to buy
property in casualty insurance, now you have to add your
terrorism purchase decision. This is something that frankly, in
many cases is getting sign-off at the Board of Directors' level. So
it's something that you have to prepare for very carefully, and
think out very thoughtfully. It is also something that we are in
the early stages of truly understanding and appreciating.
There are other things that we have to think about - certified
and non-certified events, 8 fronting,9 captives,l0 and nuclear,
biological and chemical (NBC) events.11
First, certified versus non-certified events. TRIA was geared
toward acts perpetrated by foreign terrorists, but there are also
special interest groups who will commit the same acts. I am
involved with one of our public entity insurance broking groups.
We are doing a placement for a public entity out in the western
part of the United States. They have no interest in TRIA, but
they are very interested in domestic terrorism. They are in the
crosshairs of some "Montana Mountain Men" type organization,
not foreign terrorists. Around the country there are different
oxes to be gored, depending upon your industry, what you do, and
who you are. The problem is that all these groups use the same
techniques like truck bombs, anti-personnel weapons, or the
famous shoe bomb.12 So when an event occurs how is Treasury
going to engage in the certification process? The interim final
rule that came out a couple weeks ago that dealt pretty well, I
8 See Marta Hummel, Real Estate Industry Lobbies for Renewed Terror Insurance Subsidiaries, N.Y.
SUN, Jan. 8, 2004, at 5 (distinguishing foreign terrorist events as government-certified events and
domestic terrorist events as non-certified).
9 See Risk Management; Mind the Gaps, REINS. MAG., May 1, 2003, at 22 (noting how fronting
companies have limited coverage to global companies due to TRIA).
10 See Meg Fletcher, Risk Managers Mindful of Terrorism Coverage Options, BUS. INS., Oct. 20,
2003, at 4 (observing how captives have played major rule since implementation of TRIA).
11 See Tom Clonan, Expert Advice Needed to Combat Threat, IRISH TIMES, Oct. 10, 2001, at 10
(pointing out that the best defense against an attack is the NBC suit).
12 See generally Peter G. Chronis, Legacies of War: Land Mine Problem Explosions Maim, Kill 500
per Week, DEN. POST, Sept. 15, 1996, at B-02 (stating that modem anti-personnel land mines are now
encased in plastic instead of metal, making them much more difficult to detect and more tamper proof).
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thought, with the definition of insurers.13 But, the certification
process is still unclear; we have been promised that there will be
some pretty detailed discussion of that later on. This is where
the devil is in the details, because what is Treasury going to do if
there is a terrorist act involving one of these sleeper cells we keep
hearing about where it's American citizens who are involved. My
feeling is there will be a bias to err on the side of certification,
but until we actually see the regulations we will not really have a
good sense of that.
The second major issue is fronting. One of the things that we
as insurance brokers like to do is have programs be fronted by a
single carrier. When we can do this the client enjoys a single
policy issuer and service provider, that type of thing. Fronting
arrangements were becoming more difficult to arrange in 2001,
and after 9/11, fronting was virtually impossible to arrange
because carriers did not want to be responsible to collect the
reinsurance recoverable from other carriers. Typically these
"reinsurers" in these upper layers would be other primary
insurers. These programs would be put together by Marsh and
AON and other brokers to operate as a unified placement for
administrative simplicity. Now in the aftermath of TRIA, that
fronting carrier has all the responsibility, all the obligations -
notice, coverage and everything else under TRIA - because the
business of reinsurance is exempted from TRIA.14 Thus if you
are an insurance carrier and you act as a reinsurer behind AIG
or any other insurance carrier, you have no TRIA coverage. To
make it even a little bit more complicated, let's just say the
insurer fronts for the all risk property program and your offer of
TRIA is declined. If the client declines TRIA to fronting carrier,
the reinsurers will want to exclude "fire following" from their all
risk property (re)insurance behind this fronting carrier because
they have no access to TRIA. Thus, in this case the policyholder
would lose not only coverage for the direct damage due to an act
of terrorism but also coverage for fire, which could result from
the act. TRIA has made the mechanics of putting together a
13 See Diane Levick, Insurers: Remove Terrorism Loophole, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar.
6, 2003, at El (demonstrating the difficulty in defining the term "terrorism" for insurance
purposes).
14 See Ellen Kelleher, Report Indicates TRIA is Failing to Meet Targets News Digest,
LONDON TIMES, June 2, 2003, at 17 (explaining that the lone underwriting tool of insurers
is to quote high prices to discourage take-up in cities where terrorism risks are high).
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fronted large global program for a multinational company, or a
very large individual risk requiring a lot of limit here in the U.S.,
a very difficult thing.
Thirdly, a little discussion of captives is in order. The interim
final rule that came out two weeks ago made pretty clear that if a
captive is licensed or admitted in any state and they receive
direct turn premium, they are subject to TRIA.15 There has been
a lot of interest lately with forming new domestic captives to help
deal with some of these fronting and administrative issues that
were discussed earlier.
Non-U.S. domiciled captives are not subject to TRIA.16 The
latest federal regulation said they are still looking at it. 17
Clearly, offshore captives in places like Bermuda have become
very important risk management tools. I think they (Treasury)
would like to find a way to handle these, but I am not sure what
that (solution) might be at the moment. U.S. domiciled captives
are not subject to TRIA if they act as a reinsurer behind an
admitted carrier, or if they are involved with some of the other
lines of insurance excepted from the bill.18
Finally, Nuclear, biological, chemical exposures are a huge
issue in my mind. This is a gaping hole, not so much in TRIA,
but rather in the interaction of TRIA and the reality of these
kind of losses, and the stress on insurance companies' balance
sheets that these events could create. You can see the kinds of
devices here that people can roll in your front door, or send you
through the mail. They are light, portable and they have the
potential of causing immense losses. I do not know what the
answer is. However, if you look at the various insurance policy
endorsements making their way through the state approval
process, not so much New York, but in states that are pretty
strong followers of the ISO endorsements, 19 we are seeing actual
15 See generally Jill Cueni-Cohen, Districts Insure Against Terrorism, PITTS. POST
GAZETTE, Jan. 29, 2003, at N-2 (discussing the process of presidential declaration and
district certification of a terrorist event).
16 See generally Simon Cooper, U.S. Terror Law: Insurers Bear The Brunt, INS. DAY,
Feb. 12, 2003 (stating that the original formulation of TRIA did not address captives).
17 See id. (noting that the U.S. Treasury later announced their impending inclusion but
has not yet issued guidelines).
18 See id. (clarifying that reinsurers are not subject to TRIA but are also excluded from
any compensatory benefits under the act).
19 See generally Charles H. Cox, The Evolution of Terrorism Exclusions, 4 RISK & INS.
13, 14 (2002) (detailing extensive state support for ISO exclusions for biochemical
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exclusions for acts of biological and chemical terrorism. It is
called "Other Acts of Terrorism." These endorsements are
working their way through the approval process now.
Clearly, the industry is moving toward absolute exclusion of
these kinds of events, and they are handling this is an issue for
state regulation. If compromises could be worked out there could
be coverage for nuclear, biological or chemical events to some
degree, allowed in the states, as these losses would roll up into
the TRIA mechanism. But that is a very difficult economic
equation to achieve in today's world.
As mentioned earlier, these endorsements are going through
the approval process right now. If you have not heretofore had
an exclusion, you will soon receive notification, that there is this
absolute cap on coverage for certified events. This is a global,
national, worldwide view of insurance at the carrier level. How
TRIA works at that nexus with state regulation creates the
reality of coverage for the policyholder. This gives you a sense of
just a few of the form issues that are evolving from TRIA.
The way I think most people would like to approach deciding
what to do about terrorism would be summed up in some sort of a
flow chart. All we have really been talking about is, do I buy
TRIA or not? But as we advise our clients, we ask them to take a
high-level view. Just how exposed do you feel you are? (There
are techniques that you can use to determine that.) How does
this risk affect my non-U.S. exposures? How does it affect my
U.S. exposures? In the case of the U.S. exposures, how does
TRIA work with the equation?
Pricing is another issue. As stated earlier, carriers are
adopting highly differentiated pricing strategies. It's all over the
lot. Those that are not subject to TRIA, like some of the alien
markets in Bermuda, are pricing TRIA as though it is free-
standing sabotage and terrorism, which is quite a lot less
expensive than it was a year ago, but still very costly. Some are
being intentionally non-competitive. Other carriers are just
saying I will waive a premium charge now and deal with it later
in the year. Pricing ranges from two percent to three hundred
percent of property insurance premium. We are seeing a median
terrorism).
2004]
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of about twelve percent nationally across all property now, across
all types of business, manufacturing and the like.., eighteen
percent in the top tier urban areas.20 We are seeing twenty-five
to fifty percent surcharges on New York real estate, and about
eleven percent surcharge to real estate in non-target areas.
Comparing the limits that are available in today's property
insurance programs and the deductibles the passage of TRIA has
clearly created improvement. Because TRIA has to be offered to
policyholders at substantially the same terms, the amount of
limit and the lower deductible that's available by purchasing the
main property insurance (at least for the foreign terrorism
component) is making the end product is more attractive. We are
looking across our entire book of business and estimate TRIA as
being about twenty percent of the price of what freestanding
sabotage and terrorism was toward the end of last year. It is
maybe not quite as harsh a comparison now, because the
terrorism market, particularly the London market, is also subject
to TRIA recovery. So TRIA has a beneficial effect in the
freestanding sabotage and terrorism market as well.
Freestanding sabotage and terrorism remains viable in some
situations. For instance, if you have a fronting issue you may
choose to have a U.S. domiciled captive front for the whole
program, cede the all risk property to other insurance carriers,
and keep the TRIA exposure. Then the captive can reinsure the
risk to the sabotage and terrorism markets. We are seeing a few
of those situations.
For the multinational corporations there is the international
component that has to be dealt with, as TRIA does not apply.
There are also layered and quota share situations where we have
carriers that are subject to TRIA and not subject to TRIA, or
other situations where the carrier may be subject to TRIA but we
don't like their price but do like the price of some others and
make the placement accordingly. If you can envision this "Swiss
cheese" type of structure, you can then think of the use the
sabotage and terrorism market as the difference in conditions, a
hole filling mechanism to complete the placement.
20 See generally Allyn & McNeff, supra note 7, at 843-44 (stating that the true affects of
TRIA on premiums are still unclear).
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There is a fair amount of interest in domestic terrorism in
certain areas of the country by some businesses and
governmental agencies. Some U.S. carriers are offering non-
certified event coverage to full policy limit while others are
offering the coverage to a sub limit. Again, a pretty chaotic
situation. For "trophy risks" in New York City in particular, we
are finding that the freestanding Sabotage and Terrorism
market, because of its broad coverage remains attractive. When
you compare all the variables, freestanding terrorism insurance
can provide an attractive alternative to the TRIA depending upon
the insurance carriers involved.
There is a teeny little insurance market available for nuclear,
biological and chemical through that free-standing Sabotage and
Terrorism market, but it is very expensive and very boutique. It
is only for certain firms that feel really, really exposed.
The bottom line to all this is clear, I think TRIA's a step in the
right direction. The early adopters were either required to buy
by mortgage or other contractual obligations or felt themselves to
be the most exposed thus creating the adverse selection issue we
touched on briefly. Using Pool-Re, 21 a U.K. terrorism insurance
entity that was established in response to the IRA attacks in the
late eighties, as an example the take-up rate was very low there
in the beginning. It was expensive and the coverage was very
limited. But in the next decade most of the businesses in central
London became purchasers of both Pool-Re and some of the
ancillary open market products that serve as wraparounds to
effect full coverage. So right from the beginning we knew,
because of the newness and differences, just the nature of the
beast in terms of the peril, the take-up rate for TRIA would be
slow.
It's been said the temporary nature of the act is a problem. It
is a real problem. It is a problem for the carriers and buyers.
Because, you ask, do I really make the purchase of TRIA as one
of the cornerstones of my risk management philosophy when it's
not going to be here three years from now? And, if I renew a
policy in 2004 is it going to be extended? If I renew a policy in
21 See Suzanne Kapner, New Jitters for London, N.Y. TMES, Oct. 17, 2001, at Wl
(explaining that "Pool Re was created specifically to provide reinsurance for terror
damage, backed by a government promise to pay any claims the company could not
meet").
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2005 is there a runoff provision or do I only have a partial year of
coverage? There are all these issues that the regulations at some
point will deal with. This is a new tool and it is going to take a
while to be universally appreciated and understood. You always
have the fallback position of stand-alone terrorism if you need
broader coverage.
That is where we are now, but please regard this as an interim
report. How TRIA is going to work out in the state regulatory
area, and how it really affects policyholders remains to be seen.
